DRIVER=i8042 aux /վ/File not found. %1lzd*j"T%߸ţ x,ؿ?1systemd System and Service Manager CHANGES WITH 252 🎃: Announcements of Future Feature Removals: * We intend to remove cgroup v1 support from systemd release after the end of 2023. If you run services that make explicit use of cgroup v1 features (i.e. the "legacy hierarchy" with separate hierarchies for each controller), please implement compatibility with cgroup v2 (i.e. the "unified hierarchy") sooner rather than later. Most of Linux userspace has been ported over already. * We intend to remove support for split-usr (/usr mounted separately during boot) and unmerged-usr (parallel directories /bin and /usr/bin, /lib and /usr/lib, etc). This will happen in the second half of 2023, in the first release that falls into that time window. For more details, see: https://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2022-September/048352.html Compatibility Breaks: * ConditionKernelVersion= checks that use the '=' or '!=' operators will now do simple string comparisons (instead of version comparisons á la stverscmp()). Version comparisons are still done for the ordering operators '<', '>', '<=', '>='. Moreover, if no operator is specified, a shell-style glob match is now done. This creates a minor incompatibility compared to older systemd versions when the '*', '?', '[', ']' characters are used, as these will now match as shell globs instead of literally. Given that kernel version strings typically do not include these characters we expect little breakage through this change. * The service manager will now read the SELinux label used for SELinux access checks from the unit file at the time it loads the file. Previously, the label would be read at the moment of the access check, which was problematic since at that time the unit file might already have been updated or removed. New Features: * systemd-measure is a new tool for calculating and signing expected TPM2 PCR values for a given unified kernel image (UKI) booted via sd-stub. The public key used for the signature and the signed expected PCR information can be embedded inside the UKI. This information can be extracted from the UKI by external tools and code in the image itself and is made available to userspace in the booted kernel. systemd-cryptsetup, systemd-cryptenroll, and systemd-creds have been updated to make use of this information if available in the booted kernel: when locking an encrypted volume/credential to the TPM systemd-cryptenroll/systemd-creds will use the public key to bind the volume/credential to any kernel that carries PCR information signed by the same key pair. When unlocking such volumes/credentials systemd-cryptsetup/systemd-creds will use the signature embedded in the booted UKI to gain access. Binding TPM-based disk encryption to public keys/signatures of PCR values — instead of literal PCR values — addresses the inherent "brittleness" of traditional PCR-bound TPM disk encryption schemes: disks remain accessible even if the UKI is updated, without any TPM specific preparation during the OS update — as long as each UKI carries the necessary PCR signature information. Net effect: if you boot a properly prepared kernel, TPM-bound disk encryption now defaults to be locked to kernels which carry PCR signatures from the same key pair. Example: if a hypothetical distro FooOS prepares its UKIs like this, TPM-based disk encryption is now – by default – bound to only FooOS kernels, and encry